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NOTES
PRECLUDING FDCPA CLAIMS IN
BANKRUPTCY
NATALIE KO†
INTRODUCTION
In a recent year, $72.3 billion in consumer debt, consisting of
credit cards, medical, utility, auto, and mortgage debt, was
purchased by the expanding debt-buying industry.1 Debt buyers
generally purchase this debt for “pennies on the dollar,” but will
then turn around and attempt to collect the full amount from the
consumer.2 In doing so, debt buyers utilize abusive and illegal
tactics, which include harassing consumers and their families.3
To protect consumers from such abusive practices, Congress
enacted the far-reaching and all-encompassing Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)4 to regulate the ever-

†
Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St.
John’s University School of Law.
1
FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING
INDUSTRY 7 (2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf (describing debtbuying statistics for 2008).
2
Ann Carrns, Debt Collectors to Pay $61 Million in Consumer Refunds and
Amend Their Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/
10/your-money/debt-collectors-to-pay-61-million-in-consumer-refunds-and-amend-th
eir-practices.html.
3
Id. (“In July, JPMorgan Chase agreed to pay $136 million to settle charges
that it had used illegal tactics to pursue delinquent credit card borrowers.”); see also
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Debt Collection, Consumer Information, http://www.consumer.
ftc.gov/articles/0149-debt-collection.
4
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012) (“It is the purpose
of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors . . . and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against
debt collection abuses.”).
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expanding debt collection industry.5 Congress sought to deter
illegal debt collection activities by providing consumers with a
private right of action against offending debt collectors.6
Yet, the application of the FDCPA in the context of
bankruptcy is in dispute. Particularly, it is debated as to
whether debtors in bankruptcy retain their private right of action
under the FDCPA against debt collectors who have filed an
improper proof of claim.7 In these contexts, the Bankruptcy Code
arguably overlaps and conflicts with the FDCPA in terms of
remedies offered and procedural aspects that debt collectors must
abide by.8
For years, the majority of courts facing this issue, including
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second and Eighth
Circuits, have taken the position that consumer FDCPA claims
are to be limited or precluded altogether as the supplementation
of the FDCPA is unnecessary, even detrimental, to the
Bankruptcy Code.9 However, the Eleventh Circuit, in departing
from this trend and allowing consumer FDCPA claims, was

5
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, 1692f (2012) (declaring open-ended
prohibitions on debt collector conduct and mandatory disclosure requirements on
their communications).
6
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012) (creating a private right of action for consumers
against “debt collector[s] who fail to comply” with the regulations of the FDCPA).
7
Both courts and commentators are divided on this issue. See James J. Haller
& Tara Twomey, Debt Collectors Should Not Get a Free Pass in Bankruptcy, 34 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 11, 30 (2015) (arguing that FDCPA claims should be allowed in
bankruptcy). But see, Brittany M. Dant, Comment, Down the Rabbit Hole: Crawford
v. LVNV Funding, LLC Upends the Role of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 66 MERCER L. REV. 1067, 1085 (2015) (arguing that FDCPA
claims should not be allowed and that debtors should resort to the remedies under
the Bankruptcy Code).
8
See Dant, supra note 7, at 1080 (discussing how the Bankruptcy Code already
provides remedies for situations where a debt collector files an invalid proof of
claim).
9
In re Gatewood, 533 B.R. 905 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015) (limiting the applicability
of the FDCPA to deceptive proofs of claim only); Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
276 F.3d 502, 511 (9th Cir. 2002); Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93,
96 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that consumer FDCPA claims are precluded because
underlying purpose of FDCPA is not implicated in bankruptcy); In re Chaussee, 399
B.R. 225, 227 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
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motivated by the negative implications of allowing debt collectors
to utilize certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to the
disadvantage of unrepresented debtors.10
This Note seeks to offer additional justifications and expand
upon the Eighth Circuit’s intermediate approach in harmonizing
both federal statutes by also extending certain exemptions with
the FDCPA to apply to proofs of claim in bankruptcy. Part I
examines the relevant legislative intent and procedural aspects
of both the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA.
Part II
summarizes the various approaches that courts take to the
problem and their rationale behind their decision. Part III
considers several justifications for limiting consumer
enforcement of the FDCPA in the bankruptcy context. Finally,
Part IV proposes that, to synchronize both the FDCPA and
Bankruptcy Code, courts should extend exemptions within the
FDCPA to include proofs of claim and hold that filing a proof of
claim for a stale debt, without misrepresentation and similar
deceptive practices, does not constitute a violation of the FDCPA.
I.

A.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE AND FDCPA
Bankruptcy Code

Although the Bankruptcy Code provides ample protection to
debtors, it was not designed to eliminate abusive collection
activities. Rather, Congress’s intent was to design a “whole
system under federal control which is designed to bring together
and adjust all of the rights and duties of creditors and
[embarrassed] debtors alike.”11 Further, bankruptcy courts are
the sole forum for asserting a proof of claim. Accordingly, the
Bankruptcy Code provides for the procedural aspects of filing a
proof of claim, objecting to it, and obtaining relief for any bad
faith conduct.12

10
See Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014)
(finding that the automatic allowance provision of the Bankruptcy Code allows
creditors to take advantage of unsophisticated debtors).
11
Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 231 (quoting MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil,
Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1996)).
12
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–02 (2012); Adina L. Pollan, Crawford v. LVNV Funding,
LLC: The Interplay Between the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA, 89 FLA. B.J. 58
(2015) (stating that past bankruptcy practice and explicit Bankruptcy Code
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Purpose of the Bankruptcy Code Is To Adjust Rights of
Creditors and Debtors Alike

The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a neutral
plane for both debtors and creditors to come together for a courtregulated resolution. This is accomplished by the automatic stay
provision of the Bankruptcy Code, which operates as a freeze on
creditor collection activity.13 By doing this, the Bankruptcy
Code’s automatic stay provision protects both debtors and
creditors.
The automatic stay provision grants many benefits to the
debtor. Its primary protection is that it implements an instant
freeze upon any collection activity.14 Additionally, its scope is
broad and encompasses any collection activity against debtors or
their estate.15 Accordingly, it gives a “breathing spell” to debtors
by operating as a shield so that the debtor can attempt
repayment or a reorganization plan without adverse actions by
Further, as part of the fundamental form of
creditors.16
protection for debtors, violation of the automatic stay may subject
creditors to “actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees,
and, in appropriate circumstances . . . punitive damages.”17 Some
courts have even extended “actual damages” to include emotional
injury damages.18 In addition, this private right of action is not
the only form of relief given to the debtor; it is considered a
supplement to the debtor’s right to also seek civil contempt.19 As
such, debtors are offered many options for which they may seek
relief for any violation of the automatic stay.

provisions left remedy for fraudulent and defective claims to be addressed under the
Bankruptcy Code).
13
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
14
See id.
15
See § 362(a)(2).
16
Sternberg v. Johnston, 595 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the stay
operates as a shield to the debtor allowing them a breathing spell).
17
11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).
18
See Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 269 (1st Cir. 1999).
19
See In re Kutumian, No. 13-14675-B-7, 2014 WL 2024789, at *10 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. May 15, 2014) (“[Section] 362(h)’s introduction ‘was meant to supplement, not
replace, the civil contempt remedy.’ ”).
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In addition, the automatic stay similarly protects creditors’
interests, too. Since creditor collection activity has been halted,
it essentially prevents any opportunistic attempts by other
creditors to gain an unfair advantage with respect to obtaining
payment for their claims.20
Accordingly, it can be inferred that the legislative intent
behind the Bankruptcy Code is to create a neutral forum for
debtors and creditors to come together and adjust their rights
equally.
2.

Procedural Aspects of Bankruptcy Code: Filing Proof of
Claim

Both the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure lay the foundation, rules, and procedures for
bankruptcy proceedings. To initiate a bankruptcy proceeding,
the first step requires a debtor to file a bankruptcy petition.21
Although there are various types of bankruptcies, individual
debtors may file Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy, depending
on their specific circumstances.22 Once the debtor files for
bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed to perform various tasks, such
as object to improper proofs of claim and distribute the debtor’s
estate.23
In response to the bankruptcy petition, creditors file a proof
of claim to assert their claims against the debtor.24 For example,
a creditor with a judgment or lien against the debtor would
assert his or her right by filing a proof of claim in the debtor’s
bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy Rule 3001 requires the
following information to be included in the proof of claim:
(1) name of entity from whom the creditor purchased the account;
(2) entity that held debt as of the last transaction; (3) date of last
transaction; and (4) date of last payment.25 If a creditor files a

20
See In re Ampal-American Israel Corp., 502 B.R. 361, 369 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2013) (stating that the automatic stay also protects creditors against other creditors
attempting to “jump the line”).
21
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1002.
22
Bankruptcy, U.S. CTS., www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy (last
visited Feb. 4, 2017).
23
11 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012); see also 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (2012).
24
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (“A proof of claim is a written statement setting
forth a creditor’s claim.”).
25
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(c)(3)(A)(i)-(v) (basing claims on open-ended or
revolving consumer credit agreements).
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proof of claim, it is prima facie evidence of the validity and
amount of the claim.26 Accordingly, the burden is placed on the
debtor or the bankruptcy trustee to object to a filed proof of
claim.27 If they fail to do so, under the automatic allowance
provision of the Bankruptcy Code, the claim is allowed.28
However, if the debtor does object to a proof of claim, he
must follow the procedure laid out under Rule 3007 of the
To object to a
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.29
creditor’s claim, the debtor must file a written objection with
notice of a hearing to allow the bankruptcy court to determine
whether to exclude the claim.30 The bankruptcy court has
authority, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), to modify the amount
of the claim or exclude it altogether.31
Should there be any misconduct during this process, the
bankruptcy courts are also endowed with powers to remedy bad
faith conduct and sanction its actors under Bankruptcy Rule
9011 and § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.32 The bankruptcy
court’s authority to sanction extends to creditors that file
improper proofs of claim.33 Bankruptcy Rule 9011 allows the
bankruptcy court to impose sanctions on the parties if they file
documents with the court that are either frivolous, in bad faith,
or motivated by an improper purpose.34 Essentially, this rule is
the functional equivalent of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.35 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court may sanction any
party that violates this provision under Rule 9011(c).36
Further, the bankruptcy courts possess an even broader
inherent power to sanction legal misconduct under § 105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.37 The scope of § 105(a) extends beyond the
purview of Bankruptcy Rule 9011; it allows the bankruptcy court
26
In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225, 237 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3001(f)).
27
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012).
28
Id.
29
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007.
30
Id.
31
11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2012).
32
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
33
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
34
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; see also In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir.
1995).
35
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
36
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
37
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
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to issue any order that is “necessary or appropriate” to
implement the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and prevent
abuse of its process.38 Bankruptcy courts generally exercise their
power under § 105 when parties engage in conduct that
“intentionally abuse[s] the judicial process in an unreasonable
and vexatious manner.”39
Accordingly, bankruptcy courts are vested with broad
authority to regulate and sanction the legal misconduct of parties
appearing before them.
B.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA as a subsection of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act (“CCPA”) in an effort to protect
consumers from abusive debt collection practices.40 In doing so,
many procedural safeguards, such as the debt validation process
under § 1692g and the “mini-Miranda” warning requirement,
were set in place.
Purpose of FDCPA Is Consumer Protection

1.

Congress enacted the FDCPA after it determined that the
existing laws and procedures were inadequately protecting
consumers from abusive debt collector conduct.41 Under the
FDCPA, debtors are given a private right of action to bring suit
The FDCPA’s primary
against offending debt collectors.42
scheme places open-ended prohibitions upon creditors.43 These
open-ended prohibitions may essentially be divided into two
categories: (1) “false or misleading representations,”44 and
(2) “unfair practices.”45

38

Id.; see also In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 658 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
Collins, 250 B.R. at 657 (quoting In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1047 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
40
See Dant, supra note 7, at 1070.
41
15 U.S.C. § 1692a (2012).
42
Kara B. Schissler, Note, Come and Knock on Our Door: The Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act’s Intrusion into New York’s Summary Proceedings Law, 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 315, 348 (2000).
43
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f (2012).
44
15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
45
15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
39
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In addition to open-ended prohibitions, the FDCPA is a
strict-liability statute.46 Therefore, a plaintiff does not need to
prove knowledge, intent, nor actual damages to have a successful
claim.47 Creditors who violate the FDCPA may be liable for
actual damages, statutory damages up to $1,000, and reasonable
attorney fees and costs.48
Traditionally, courts have construed the statute very broadly
in an effort to protect all consumers, ranging from the most
“shrewd” to the most “gullible.”49 To effectuate this goal, courts
use the “least sophisticated consumer standard” when
determining whether an FDCPA violation exists.50 In general,
federal circuit and district courts have held that a debt collector
bringing a civil action to collect on stale debt per se violates the
FDCPA.51
However, one limitation of the FDCPA is that it does not
regulate all creditor conduct; rather, it applies only to “debt
collectors” within the meaning as defined by the statute.
Pursuant to § 1692a of the FDCPA, “[t]he term ‘debt collector’
means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another.”52 The statute proceeds by
listing six groups of creditors exempt from debt collector status.53

46
Derek S. Burrell, The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: An Overview
Rx for Debt Collector Myopia, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 27 (1996) (discussing the strict
“mini-Miranda” warning requirement and how its strategic placement or
concealment on notices will cause debt collectors to be held strictly liable under the
FDCPA).
47
In re Broadrick, 532 B.R. 60, 65 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
48
15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012).
49
Broadrick, 532 B.R. at 65 (quoting Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar,
503 F.3d 504, 509 (6th Cir. 2007)).
50
See United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 135–36 (4th Cir.
1996) (discussing that most courts apply the “least sophisticated consumer” standard
to evaluate violations of the FDCPA).
51
See Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2013)
(stating that filing a suit after the statute of limitations on a claim had run violates
the FDCPA); Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 2011)
(recognizing that a majority of courts have held that threatened or actual litigation
to collect on a stale debt violates the FDCPA); Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634 F.3d 779,
783, 787 (5th Cir. 2011) (same).
52
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012).
53
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A)–(F).
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Accordingly, the purpose of the FDCPA is to protect
consumers against the abusive actions of debt collectors. This is
accomplished by holding debt collectors strictly liable for
violating any of its broadly interpreted open-ended prohibitions.
However, inasmuch as it seeks to protect all consumers, the
reach of the FDCPA does not regulate all creditor conduct.
Procedural Aspects of the FDCPA

2.

In addition to imposing open-ended prohibitions on debt
collectors, the FDCPA requires debt collectors to comply with two
important procedural aspects. First, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g outlines
the debt validation procedure for circumstances where a
consumer wants to dispute the validity of a debt. Second,
§ 1692e(11) mandates a “mini-Miranda” warning to be placed
upon specific communications sent by the debt collector.
Debt validation, under § 1692g, requires the debt collector to
send the consumer a written communication notifying him of his
right to obtain a verification of the debt.54 One of the underlying
purposes of this requirement is to target the debt-buying
industry—debt collectors who purchased the debt from the
original creditor, but collect on the debt under a different name.55
Through verification, the debt collector must disclose the name
and address of the original creditor and provide supporting
documentation of the debt.56 Debt collectors must comply with
this process after making any “initial communication[s]” with the
consumer.57 However, under the statute, “formal pleading[s]” are
exempt and do not constitute an initial communication under the
FDCPA.58
In addition, a second procedural requirement of the FDCPA
is the “mini-Miranda” warning.59 Debt collectors are mandated
to disclose their intent to collect a debt and warn the consumer

54

15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012).
Elizabeth Lea Black, Construction and Application of Provision of Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act Relating to Validation of Debts (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692g), 150
A.L.R. Fed. 101, 2a (1998).
56
§ 1692g(b).
57
§ 1692g(a).
58
§ 1692g(d). “Initial communications” and “formal pleadings” are not defined
within the statute.
59
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012).
55
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that any information obtained will be utilized for that purpose.60
Similar to the debt validation procedure, this provision also
exempts “formal pleading” from compliance.61
Accordingly, both the debt validation and mini-Miranda
warning provisions serve to protect consumers through
mandatory disclosure. However, both provide the same exception
to formal pleadings.
II. VARIOUS APPROACHES COURTS HAVE UTILIZED
Courts addressing the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Code
necessarily precludes FDCPA claims based on improper proofs of
claim have taken various positions. On one end of the spectrum,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
concluded that FDCPA claims are not precluded. On the other
end, the Second and Ninth Circuits have disagreed and held that
FDCPA claims are precluded. The Eighth Circuit, however, has
taken an intermediate approach in an effort to harmonize both
federal statutes and held that the FDCPA is only implicated in
specific circumstances.
A.

Eleventh Circuit and the State Court Analogy of “Unfairness”

The Eleventh Circuit found that the Bankruptcy Code did
not preclude FDCPA claims. In Crawford v. LVNV Funding,
LLC,62 the Eleventh Circuit held that filing a proof of claim in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding to collect on a stale debt
violated the FDCPA for the same reasons it would violate the
FDCPA in an ordinary state court action.63 Using this state court
analogy, the court reasoned that the automatic allowance
provision in the Bankruptcy Code allows creditors to take unfair
advantage of unsophisticated debtors and collect payments on
stale debt.64
In Crawford, plaintiff owed a debt to a furniture company.65
The debt collector purchased this debt from the furniture
company in 2001; the statute of limitations subsequently expired

60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1262; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2012).
Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1262.
Id. at 1256.
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in 2004.66 In 2008, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and
the debt collector filed a proof of claim to collect on the debt
despite the fact that the statute of limitations had expired four
years earlier.67 Neither plaintiff nor the bankruptcy trustee
objected to the proof of claim.68 After four years of making
payments towards the claim, plaintiff objected to the claim and
initiated a lawsuit alleging that the debt collector violated the
FDCPA by filing a proof of claim for stale debt.69 The case
eventually made its way to the Eleventh Circuit after the district
court affirmed dismissal of her claim.70
To start its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit examined both the
underlying purpose and open-ended prohibitions of the FDCPA.71
Specifically, it emphasized the “unfair practices” prohibition
under the FDCPA.72 The court stated that threatening to sue or
filing a lawsuit to collect a stale debt would constitute a per se
violation of the FDCPA in state court.73 In state court, stale suits
are considered unfair under the FDCPA for several reasons:
(1) unsophisticated debtors may unsuspectingly acquiesce to the
lawsuit as they are unaware that they may assert a statute of
limitations defense; (2) the plaintiff’s recollection of the validity
of the debt is dulled with the passage of time; and (3) given the
amount of time that has passed, the plaintiff may no longer have
personal records regarding the allegedly owed debt.74 Through
this line of reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the
importance of the statute of limitations in guarding against these
unfair outcomes in civil litigation.75
This same principle is equally applicable in the bankruptcy
context.76 Particularly, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the
automatic allowance provision, under 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)–(b) and
Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f), which automatically allows a claim
66

Id. (stating that Alabama statute of limitations of three years governed this

debt).
67

Id.
Id. at 1259.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1257.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1258.
73
Id. at 1259.
74
Id. at 1260 (quoting Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079
(7th Cir. 2013)).
75
Id.
76
Id.
68
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against a Chapter 13 debtor unless there is an objection from
either the debtor or the trustee.77 As is what happened in this
case, under the bankruptcy rules, a debt collector may file a proof
of claim asserting a stale debt and still be able to collect on a debt
that would otherwise be unenforceable in court if both the debtor
and trustee fail to object to it.78 Accordingly, filing a proof of
claim for a stale debt produces the same unfair consequences as
in state court. Given the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic allowance
provision, the debt collector was able to collect payment from the
plaintiff’s future wages as part of the Chapter 13 repayment plan
when the debt collector would not otherwise be able to enforce
such a right through litigation.79 Further, even if a debtor were
to object, objecting to a proof of claim would cause him or her to
expend resources and energy similar to filing a limitations
defense in state court.80
The debt collector argued that allowing an FDCPA claim in
this circumstance would contradict the automatic stay provision
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6);81 essentially, the
court’s holding would imply that a proof of claim is a form of debt
collection activity prohibited by the stay.82 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected this argument by distinguishing between direct and
indirect methods of debt collection. As an indirect means of debt
collection, filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding does
not come into conflict with the automatic stay.83
In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit concluded by analogy
that since the debt collector would be liable under the FDCPA
claim in state court, he is similarly liable under the FDCPA in
bankruptcy court.84

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1259.
Id.
Id. at 1261.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1261–62.
Id. at 1262.
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Second and Ninth Circuits Found That the Bankruptcy Code
Precludes FDCPA Claims

The Second and Ninth Circuits found that the Bankruptcy
Code precluded FDCPA claims. The Second Circuit, in Simmons
v. Roundup Funding, LLC,85 reasoned that the underlying
purpose of the FDCPA is not implicated in the bankruptcy
context.86 The bankruptcy court offers sufficient protection to a
debtor when it presides over a debtor’s bankruptcy case.
Therefore, it is unnecessary and contrary to any expressed intent
by Congress to have the FDCPA serve as a supplement to the
remedies already provided for in bankruptcy.87 In fact, in In re
Chaussee,88 the Ninth Circuit found that the allowance of FDCPA
might even run to the detriment of the Bankruptcy Code.89
Second Circuit: Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC90

1.

In Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, the Second Circuit
held that a proof of claim stating the incorrect amount owed
could not form the basis of an FDCPA claim.91 The plaintiff in
Simmons filed for bankruptcy in 2007.92 The debt collector filed a
proof of claim for a debt in the amount of $2,039.21.93 The
plaintiffs objected to the proof of claim and the Bankruptcy Court
ultimately modified the amount to $1,100, an amount the
plaintiffs admitted that they owed.94 The plaintiffs subsequently
brought a class-action lawsuit in district court against the debt
collector, alleging an FDCPA violation for misrepresenting the
amount of debt owed.95 In response, the debt collector moved to
dismiss the complaint arguing that an FDCPA claim could not be
based on an inflated proof of claim.96 The district court agreed
with the debt collector and dismissed the complaint.

85

622 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 95–96.
87
Id. at 96.
88
399 B.R. 225 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
89
Id. at 236–37 (quoting Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510
(9th Cir. 2002)).
90
See generally Simmons, 622 F.3d 93.
91
Id. at 96.
92
Id. at 94.
93
Id. at 95.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
86
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Upon appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the legislative
history of the FDCPA.97 Citing several decisions from other
district courts, the Second Circuit concluded that filing a proof of
claim in bankruptcy court was not the type of abusive conduct
contemplated by the FDCPA and, therefore, could not be the
basis for an FDCPA action.98 In arriving at this conclusion, the
Second Circuit reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code already
provided sufficient protection to the debtors against abuses that
the FDCPA sought to protect.99 Due to the supervision of the
court, discharge of the debt, and the protections afforded by
bankruptcy to debtors, the underlying purpose of the FDCPA was
no longer implicated.100
Further, the Second Circuit justified its approach by stating
that the Bankruptcy Code provided adequate remedies to an
aggrieved debtor, which could include revoking an improper proof
of claim or utilizing the court’s contempt power.101 However,
instead of seeking a remedy under the Bankruptcy Code, the
plaintiffs immediately commenced an action under the FDCPA.102
The Second Circuit reasoned that filing an FDPCA claim was
potentially more lucrative for the plaintiff than seeking remedy
“[N]othing in the FDCPA
from the bankruptcy courts.103
suggest[ed] that it is intended as an overlay to the protections
already in place in the bankruptcy proceedings.”104 Accordingly,
the Second Circuit held that the only recourse that debtors who
fall victim to fraudulent proofs of claim have is through the
Bankruptcy Code itself.105 Recourse through the FDCPA is
foreclosed.

97
Id. (“Congress acted with the aim of eliminating abusive practices in the debt
collection industry, and also sought to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain
from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.”).
98
Id. at 96.
99
Id. (“[T]here is no need to supplement the remedies afforded by bankruptcy
itself.”).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. (quoting Gray-Mapp v. Sherman, 100 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814 (N.D. Ill.
1999)).
104
Id.
105
See id. (“While the FDCPA’s purpose is to avoid bankruptcy, if bankruptcy
nevertheless occurs, the debtor’s protection and remedy remain under the
Bankruptcy Code.” (quoting Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th
Cir. 2002))).
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Ninth Circuit: In re Chaussee and Its Reliance on Walls v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.106

In Chaussee, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Code
precluded the plaintiff’s FDCPA claims.107 The plaintiff, who
filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, had commenced an action
against the debt collector alleging various violations including an
FDCPA claim.108 The two credit card debts in dispute were
assigned to the debt collector from a collection agency.109 The
debt collector subsequently filed two proofs of claim in the
plaintiff’s bankruptcy case with inadequate supporting
documentation.110
The plaintiff commenced an action against the debt collector
alleging that: (1) they violated both the state Consumer
Protection Act (“the CPA”) and FDCPA because the debts were
barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) they were attempting
to collect on a debt that she did not owe, as a different name was
listed as the account holder.111 The debt collector subsequently
moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing neither the CPA nor
FDCPA were applicable to proofs of claim in bankruptcy
proceedings.112 Further, the debt collector argued that plaintiff’s
exclusive remedy for challenging a proof of claim was to object to
it pursuant to the relevant Bankruptcy Rules.113 Their motion
also contended that plaintiff had already obtained adequate relief
pursuant to § 502(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code when the
bankruptcy court excluded the debt collector’s proofs of claim.114
The Bankruptcy Court, relying on Walls v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.,115 held that the Bankruptcy Code precluded the
plaintiff’s FDCPA claims.
The facts in Walls are rather
straightforward. A Chapter 7 debtor, who was able to keep her
home, continued to make payments on her mortgage despite

106

See generally In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 227.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 228.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 228–29 (“[A]n order was entered by the bankruptcy court on December
18, 2007, sustaining the objection and disallowing [the debt collector’s] claims.”).
115
276 F.3d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 2002).
107
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having it discharged in bankruptcy.116 When the debtor later
stopped making payments on the mortgage, the debt collector
foreclosed.117 In response, the debtor brought a class action in
federal court alleging FDCPA violations that the debt collector
attempted to collect on a discharged debt.118 The Walls court
dismissed the action, stating that the Bankruptcy Code
precluded the FDCPA claim.119
Identifying that the source of the FDCPA claim was a
violation of § 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Walls court
reasoned that allowing an FDCPA claim would be unnecessary
for three reasons: (1) the bankruptcy court’s power under § 105 of
the Bankruptcy Code remedies § 524 violations;120 (2) allowing
FDCPA claims in these circumstances would subject the district
court to “bankruptcy-laden” determinations, which would be
irrelevant to the FDCPA;121 and (3) allowing an FDCPA claim
would essentially create a back door for debtors to circumvent the
bankruptcy’s remedial scheme.122 The Walls court found that the
legislature intended to design the Bankruptcy system as a forum
to “adjust all the rights and duties of creditors and . . . debtors
alike” and not to allow debtors to circumvent this remedial
scheme through the FDCPA.123 Accordingly, the Walls court
concluded that, although federal statutes should be read jointly
when possible, the Chapter 7 debtor’s remedies were limited to
those provided under the Bankruptcy Code because to hold
otherwise would circumvent the nature of the Bankruptcy
Code.124
Adopting the Walls approach, finding that the
Bankruptcy Code “represents a ‘whole system’ designed to

116
Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 235 (citing Walls, 276 F.3d at 505 (internal citations
omitted)).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 235–36.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 235 (quoting Walls, 276 F.3d at 510).
122
Id. at 235–36 (“This would circumvent the remedial scheme of the Code
under which Congress struck a balance between the interests of debtors and
creditors by permitting (and limiting) debtor’s remedies for violating the discharge
injunction to contempt.”).
123
Id. at 236 (quoting Walls, 276 F.3d at 510 (citation omitted)).
124
Id. (citing Walls, 276 F.3d at 510).
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comprehensively define all rights and remedies of debtors and
creditors,” the Ninth Circuit in Chaussee held that the FDCPA is
precluded.125
The plaintiff, relying on Randolph v. IMBS, Inc.,126 urged the
Court to rule similarly and allow her FDCPA claim.127 The Court
rejected Randolph and held that it was bound by precedent to
apply the Walls reasoning instead.128 However, in dicta, the
Ninth Circuit stated that it would nevertheless reject Randolph’s
reasoning as inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.129 The
Ninth Circuit proceeds with comparing the differing procedural
aspects between the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA,
specifically the automatic allowance provision of the Bankruptcy
Code and the FDCPA validation requirements, respectively.130
For example, the automatic allowance provision of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt, when asserted in a proof
of claim, is valid unless the debtor affirmatively objects to it.131
In contrast, under the FDCPA’s scheme, the debtor’s failure to
contest the validity of the debt does not constitute an admission
of liability.132 Accordingly, in light of such a direct contradiction,
the Court concluded that it could not reconcile both the statutory
schemes of the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA.133
In addition, the Ninth Circuit found that attempts to comply
with both statutory schemes would result in confusion. For
example, under the debt validation provision of the FDCPA, the
debt collector is mandated to send a notice informing the debtor
of his or her right to dispute the debt.134 Upon receiving the
notice, a debtor would be uncertain whether to dispute the debt
under the procedures laid out under the FDCPA or object to the
claim through the bankruptcy process.135 The Ninth Circuit was
125

Id. at 241.
368 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding no direct conflict between the
Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA and allowing plaintiff’s FDCPA claim to proceed).
127
Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 237.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 237–38.
131
11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012).
132
Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 238; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(c) (2012).
133
Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 239.
134
Id. at 238; see also § 1692g. The Court even points out the ambiguity as to
whether proofs of claim would be required to comply with § 1692g. Chaussee, 399
B.R. at 238.
135
Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 239.
126
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unable to reconcile the validation process under the FDCPA and
the claims objection process under the Bankruptcy Code.
Consequently, it concluded that Congress did not intend for the
FDCPA to apply to proof of claims filed in bankruptcy court.136
In arguing for the allowance of her FDCPA claim, the debtor
contended that the Bankruptcy Code did not rectify the debt
collector’s misconduct in filing an improper proof of claim—
something that the FDCPA strict-liability approach targets.137
Specifically, she argued that the Bankruptcy Code provided
inadequate protection by allowing debt collectors to assert
unenforceable claims and then subsequently placing an
unreasonable burden, in terms of fees and costs, on the debtor to
object to them.138 The Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that
objecting to improper proofs of claim is overly burdensome
because a debtor may object to a claim by merely filing a singlepage document after conducting a claims analysis, which is, in
any event, presumably completed under the ordinary course of
bankruptcy proceedings regardless.139
Further, the debtor asserted that recovery, under
Bankruptcy Rule 9011, posed a greater difficulty than the strictliability standard as established under the FDCPA.140 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this contention because—although the remedies
provided by Bankruptcy Rule 9011 should be sufficient—under
§ 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts are
inherently vested with power to remedy patterns of bad faith
conduct that extend beyond the reach of Bankruptcy Rule
With this, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
9011.141
Bankruptcy Code adequately deterred abuse of the bankruptcy
process and provided relief to aggrieved debtors.142 As a result,
the court held that FDCPA claims are precluded under the
Bankruptcy Code.143

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 239–40.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 240–41.
Id. at 241.
Id.
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Eighth Circuit’s Intermediate Approach

The Eighth Circuit in In re Gatewood144 explicitly rejected
the holdings of both Crawford and Simmons.145 Instead, the
Eighth Circuit adopted the rationale of a lower court by holding
that filing an accurate proof of claim containing all relevant
information, including the timing of the debt, is not a violation of
the FDCPA.146
The facts in Gatewood are very similar to those in Crawford.
The plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2013 and, in
response, the debt collector filed a proof of claim for a stale
medical debt.147 The plaintiffs failed to object to the proof of
claim and entered into a repayment plan where the debt collector
participated in collecting monthly payments.148 During that
time, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the debt
collector, asserting violation of the FDCPA.149
In rejecting Crawford and Simmons, the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that both cases did not adopt the “cardinal principle of
construction,” which is to give effect to both federal statutes.150
Findings of an automatic violation or complete preclusion of the
FDCPA, as held in Crawford and Simmons, respectively, run
contrary to the goal of harmonizing both the FDCPA and
Bankruptcy Code.151 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit adopted an
intermediate approach by limiting the FDCPA’s applicability to
only specific circumstances.152 Since the FDCPA prohibits false
and misleading practices, filing an accurate proof of claim and
disclosing all relevant information does not implicate the
FDCPA.153

144

533 B.R. 905 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 909–10 (quoting Broadrick v. LVNV Funding LLC (In re Broadrick),
532 B.R. 60, 75 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2015)).
146
Id. at 910.
147
Id. at 906. The two-year statute of limitations had already expired. Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 910 (quoting Broadrick, 532 B.R. at 74).
151
Id.
152
Id. (specifying that the FDCPA “simply prohibits false, misleading, deceptive,
unfair, or unconscionable debt collection”).
153
Id.
145
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III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LIMITING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
FDCPA
Several reasons justify limiting the FDCPA’s applicability in
the context of proofs of claim. Some reasons include: (1) debt
collectors’ inability to simultaneously comply with requirements
of the Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA; (2) allowing FDCPA claims
may have a detrimental effect on the Bankruptcy Code; (3) debt
collectors are denied an opportunity for the Bankruptcy Court to
adjudicate their claims; and (4) lastly, the misplaced concerns
against the preclusion of FDCPA claims.
A.

Simultaneous Compliance with the FDCPA and Bankruptcy
Code Is Not Feasible

The FDCPA should be inapplicable to improper proofs of
claim because simultaneous compliance with both federal
statutes is not feasible. The strongest example being that the
FDCPA’s mini-Miranda notice requirement directly conflicts with
the Bankruptcy Code. Under the FDCPA, debt collectors must
place a mini-Miranda warning that discloses their intent to
collect a debt.154 Generally, failure to include the mini-Miranda
warning constitutes an FDCPA violation.155 However, the plain
language of the mini-Miranda warning violates the automatic
stay of the Bankruptcy Code because debt collectors are
purporting to collect on a debt.156 As a result, debt collectors
would be faced with an impermissible choice: leave the miniMiranda warning off and violate the FDCPA, or include the miniMiranda warning and violate the Bankruptcy Code.157
Further, even in a scenario where debt collectors are
somehow able to comply with both the Bankruptcy Code and
FDCPA when filing their proof of claim, debtors would be left
with a confusing choice when disputing the validity of a claim:
should they object to the claim under § 502 of the Bankruptcy
154
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012). The mini-Miranda warning requires debt
collectors to disclose that they are “attempting to collect a debt and that any
information obtained will be used for that purpose.” Id.
155
Id.
156
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2012).
157
See Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2013)
(stating that debt collectors would be faced with a conflict between Bankruptcy Code
and the FDCPA); see also Torres v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 530 B.R. 268, 273 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2015) (discussing Simon’s rationale for direct conflict between Bankruptcy
Code and FDCPA).
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Code or bring a claim under the FDCPA?158 Accordingly, the
direct conflict between both the federal statutes necessitates the
preclusion of the FDCPA in the context of filing proofs of claim in
a bankruptcy proceeding.
Other circuit courts addressing this same issue have found
that the direct conflict between the FDCPA and Bankruptcy
Code necessitates an inference of an implied statutory repeal of
the FDCPA. Specifically, the Third Circuit, in Simon v. FIA
Card Services, N.A.,159 held a strong position that courts must
read federal statutes together unless there is a “positive
repugnancy.”160 Even holding that there is a strong inference
against implied statutory repeal, the Simon court, when
considering the same contradiction between the mini-Miranda
requirement of the FDCPA and the automatic stay provision of
the Bankruptcy Code, could not reconcile both federal statutes.161
Accordingly, it held that such a direct conflict was sufficient
enough to produce a finding that an FDCPA claim for failure to
include a mini-Miranda notice was precluded.162
B.

Detrimental Effect on the Bankruptcy Code

The bankruptcy courts are endowed with broad powers to
remedy any potential creditor misconduct,163 allowing debtors to
bring FDCPA claims would potentially render some of its powers
obsolete. As explained earlier in this Note, Bankruptcy Rule
9011 is essentially identical to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; it allows the bankruptcy courts to sanction
abuse of the process.164 Further, if needed, the bankruptcy courts

158
In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225, 238–39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the
confusion that would ensue because debtors would not know whether to use the
Bankruptcy Code or FDCPA to remedy wrongful proofs of claim).
159
732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013).
160
Id. at 274 (“ ‘[W]hen two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to
regard each as effective.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143–44 (2001))).
161
Id. at 280.
162
Id.
163
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c) (“[T]he court may . . . impose an appropriate
sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b)
or are responsible for the violation.”); 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) (“The court may issue
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title.”); see also supra Section I.A.2.
164
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c).
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also have an even broader inherent authority under
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to sanction parties for conduct that is beyond
the reach of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and similar statutes.165 Two
examples illustrate how FDCPA claims can render the
bankruptcy court’s powers useless.
First, the allowance of FDCPA claims to supplement the
relief offered by bankruptcy courts raises the concern of the
bankruptcy court’s power under 11 U.S.C. § 502 being obsolete.
For example, it is likely that debtors will no longer resort to the
bankruptcy court to exclude an objectionable proof of claim when
they are able to bring their own private right of action to hold the
debt collector strictly liable for damages.166 In another instance,
debtors who fail to properly review and object to improper proofs
of claim under the bankruptcy process may bring an FDCPA
claim to recover on their own negligence. As a result, the
bankruptcy court’s power under 11 U.S.C. § 502 may be rendered
useless. The allowance of FDCPA claims against improper proofs
of claim incentivizes debtors to forego the standard bankruptcy
process and resort to the FDCPA’s strict-liability scheme.
Second, the Walls court followed this same line of reasoning
and determined that the exclusive remedy should rest with the
Bankruptcy Code.167 In Walls, the debtor commenced an FDCPA
action for a creditor’s violation of discharge injunction on her
mortgage.168 Although the Bankruptcy Code already provides
civil contempt under § 105(a) as an enforcement mechanism for
violations of the discharge injunction, the debtor resorted only to
the FDCPA.169 Finding that her FDCPA claim was precluded,
the Walls court held that allowing FDCPA would circumvent the
remedial scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.170
Accordingly, the application of FDCPA claims in the context
of improper proofs of claim may negatively impact the existing
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code rather than supplement it.

165

11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
See Dant, supra note 7, at 1084.
167
Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 2002).
168
Id. at 504.
169
Id.
170
Id at 510. (“To permit a simultaneous claim under the FDCPA would allow
through the back door what Walls cannot accomplish through the front door—a
private right of action.”).
166
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Debt Collectors Would Receive Differential Treatment and
Rights

By allowing FDCPA actions to be brought for filing proofs of
claim asserting stale debt, debt collectors would be given
differential treatment and rights depending on their status under
the FDCPA. First, because the FDCPA does not apply uniformly
to all creditors, some creditors risk FDCPA liability while others
will not. Second, the expiration of the statute of limitations does
not extinguish a creditor’s rights to a debt, only his or her
Therefore, by allowing FDCPA actions, certain
remedy.171
creditors are effectively prevented from asserting their valid
right to payment in the form of a proof of claim.
Creditors in bankruptcy courts would be faced with unequal
treatment; some will be sanctioned under the Bankruptcy Code
while others will face FDCPA liability for essentially the same
types of violations. As stated before, not all creditors fall within
the meaning of “debt collector,” as defined by the statute.172 For
example, a private individual who does not qualify as a debt
collector may still file a proof of claim asserting a stale debt
against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. As a result, nondebtcollector creditors would still be able to assert stale claims
without fear of liability under the FDCPA. This inconsistent
treatment of creditors for the same violations will cause
additional confusion for courts in determining the proper course
of action and assessing damages.
Further, if FDCPA claims are allowed, debt collectors are
prevented from asserting their valid right to payment. The
expiration of the statute of limitations does not extinguish the
creditor’s rights to the debt, only his or her remedy.173 This is
unlike statutes of repose, which are substantive, and extinguish
both the right and the remedy. Statutes of limitation, in
contrast, are considered to be procedural only and function to
extinguish only the remedy.174 As such, a debt collector’s right to
payment still exists even after the statute of limitations has

171
172
173
174

In re Broadrick, 532 B.R. 60, 74 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
Jones v. Methodist Healthcare, 83 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
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expired.175 Accordingly, by ruling that a proof of claim asserting
a stale debt is a violation of the FDCPA, courts have effectively
prevented creditors from filing legitimate claims to the detriment
of the claim-determination process.176
D. Concerns Raised Against the Preclusion of FDCPA Claims
Are Misplaced
Various arguments that have been advanced in support for
allowing FDCPA actions be brought against creditors who file a
proof of claim asserting a stale debt are misguided. Specifically,
the unfairness analogy that the Crawford court employed did not
account for fundamental differences between state and
bankruptcy proceedings. Also, the presumption against repeal by
implication is rebuttable when two federal statutes directly
conflict with one another.
1.

Unfairness Analogy from State Court Proceedings

The concern raised in Crawford, allowing debt collectors to
file a proof of claim asserting stale debt is “unfair,” is
unfounded.177 The crux of the concern is that the proof of claim
would mislead an unsophisticated consumer into believing that it
was an enforceable debt—given the passage of time and the
consumer’s likely unawareness of the limitations defense—using
the same rationale employed by state courts.178 In addition, the
concern of misleading unsophisticated consumers is further
strengthened by the exponential increase in pro se bankruptcy
filings in recent years.179

175
Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 699 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (“That
a claim is not allowable because a statute of limitation has expired does not defeat
the existence of the claim in bankruptcy.”).
176
See id. A debtor may even have an interest in having a stale debt paid in
bankruptcy; for example, a co-signor may be rendered responsible for payment. See
In re Gatewood, 533 B.R. 905, 910 n.4 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015).
177
Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014).
178
Id.
179
Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other
Debtor Relief, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011), https://apps.americanbar.org/
litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-se-bankruptcy-growing.html;
see
also Torres v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 530 B.R. 268, 275 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (discussing the
concern raised in Crawford that debtors may be forced to settle lawsuit to avoid
litigation costs); Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir.
2013) (stating that even if a debtor knows to use the limitations defense, they will be
more inclined to settle the debt in order to avoid costs and embarrassment).
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However, many key distinctions between the nature of the
bankruptcy courts and state courts illustrate the flaw in merely
analogizing the unfairness aspect of filing a lawsuit in state court
to filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy.180 Some distinctions
include: (1) special protections in bankruptcy court not found in
state court; (2) debtor initiates bankruptcy proceeding and
invites the participation of creditors; and (3) the involvement of a
trustee.181
First, bankruptcy court provides special protections to
debtors that are not afforded to them in state court, such as the
automatic stay, bankruptcy discharge of debt, and required
disclosures for proofs of claim.182 As stated above, the automatic
stay prevents the creditor from liquidating the debtor’s assets.183
Further, a bankruptcy discharge provides an even broader
protection than that contemplated by the FDCPA.184 If a debt is
discharged, a creditor is prevented from even asking for payment
on a stale debt.185 Lastly, when a creditor files a proof of claim,
they are required to disclose information such as the date of last
payment, the date of last transaction, and the name of the entity
that the debt was owed to at the time of last transaction.186
Therefore, this leaves the debtor in a superior position to identify
As such,
stale debts at the outset of the bankruptcy.187
bankruptcy courts vastly differ in protections offered to the
debtor than in state courts.
Second, the bankruptcy process is not similar to a state court
lawsuit as the debtor initiates the proceeding and invites the
participation of creditors. In contrast, state court proceedings
are generally commenced against the debtor, and they must
affirmatively assert the statute of limitations defense.
180
See Broadrick v. LVNV Funding LLC (In re Broadrick), 532 B.R. 60, 69
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2015) (summarizing the state analogy raised by the Crawford
court).
181
See Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010); FED.
R. BANKR. P. 1002(a) (stating that the debtor files a proof of claim to initiate the
process); 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
182
See Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the supervision of
the court and its officers provides adequate protection and does not require the
FDCPA to supplement it).
183
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
184
In re Broadrick, 532 B.R. 60, 71 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
185
Id.
186
Id. at 72.
187
Id.
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Oftentimes, a pro se debtor may not know of the limitations
defense and run the risk of inadvertently waiving it. In
bankruptcy, the debtor is not required to take affirmative action
as the bankruptcy trustee generally reviews and objects to proofs
of claim.188 This is another key distinction between bankruptcy
and state court proceedings that upends any analogy between the
two.
Lastly, in addition to the special protections mentioned
above, a trustee is appointed to safeguard the interests of the
debtor.189 As discussed before, a trustee is charged with specific
duties such as administering the estate, objecting to claims, and
furnishing information concerning the estate.190 No trustee is
automatically appointed for debtors to perform similar tasks in
state court. The presence of a trustee further contributes to the
difference in the nature of bankruptcy proceedings.
Accordingly, given the vastly different natures of the two
proceedings, the unfairness aspect cannot be merely analogized
to a bankruptcy context.
2.

Presumption Against Federal Repeal by Implication

It is well established that finding an implicit repeal or
preemption of a federal statute is generally disfavored.191 This
same principle is especially applicable in the context of
bankruptcy. In Butner v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court grappled with an issue concerning whether a
federal rule in equity or state law governed the right to use rents
collected during bankruptcy.192 In reaching a conclusion, the
court held in the absence of a specific bankruptcy interest or
provision, bankruptcy courts will take non-bankruptcy rights as
they are found.193 Accordingly, given the presumption against
188

11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (2012); see also Broadrick, 532 B.R. at 73.
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5).
190
11 U.S.C. § 704(a).
191
See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 619
F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that there is a presumption against finding
an implicit federal repeal because it requires a court to speculate as to legislative
intent).
192
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). Although the Bankruptcy Act
has been superseded by the Bankruptcy Code, the proposition articulated in Butner
still stands.
193
Id. at 55 (“Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no
reason why such interests should be analyzed should be analyzed differently simply
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”).
189
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finding a repeal by implication and Butner’s philosophy, courts
are generally reluctant to find that the FDCPA has no
applicability in the bankruptcy context.194
However, both these doctrines recognize that in light of a
direct contradiction, the presumption against repeal by
implication is rebutted.195 As explained above, certain aspects of
the FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code directly contradict with one
another and cannot be reconciled.196 As a result, even courts that
have taken a position against implying preemption have
recognized that there is an irreconcilable conflict between both
federal statutes. However, this Note argues that a solution
exists without requiring courts to resort to repeal by implication
of the FDCPA.
IV. EXPANSION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
To resolve the present issue, this Note proposes that courts
should take various actions to limit the applicability of the
FDCPA in the context of filing proofs of claim without having to
resort to repeal by implication. First, courts should extend the
“formal pleading” exemption, under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11) and
1692g(d), to encompass proofs of claim. Second, courts should
hold that absent additional factors such as fraud or
misrepresentation, a proof of claim asserting a stale debt does
not implicate the FDCPA.
A.

Extend the “Formal Pleading” Exemption To Include Proofs
of Claim

Courts should extend the “formal pleadings” exemption,
under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d) of the FDCPA, to
include proofs of claim. By extending this exemption, debt
collectors filing a proof of claim will not have to comply with the
mini-Miranda and debt validation requirements of the FDCPA.
Therefore, the direct contradictions and confusion associated

194
See Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2013)
(discussing the inference against finding a federal repeal by implication).
195
Id.
196
For discussion on how courts have been unable to reconcile the contradiction
between the FDCPA mini-Miranda warning requirement and the Bankruptcy’s
automatic stay, see supra text accompany note 150.

1090

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1063

with complying with both the FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code will
be eliminated without resorting to repeal by implication of the
FDCPA.
Both §§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d) set forth requirements that
conflict with the Bankruptcy Code’s scheme. As discussed
earlier, § 1692e(11) requires debt collectors to place a miniMiranda warning on certain communications and § 1692g sets
forth a debt validation process.197 However, both provisions
conflict with aspects of the Bankruptcy Code.198 By utilizing the
form pleadings exemption found in both provisions of the
FDCPA, the obligations will not be triggered and creditors will
not be held liable under the FDCPA for failure to include them
when filing a proof of claim. As a result, the direct conflict
between the Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA will be eliminated.
Several lower federal courts have held that proofs of claim
constitute a “formal pleading” for purposes of the FDCPA.199 The
weight of authority has held that filing a proof of claim is
seemingly analogous to filing a complaint.200 Just as litigants file
a complaint in civil actions, creditors file a proof of claim in
bankruptcy actions. Accordingly, to resolve any direct conflicts
that the FDCPA notice requirements impose upon debt collectors
attempting to file a proof of claim, courts should hold that a proof
of claim is considered a “formal pleading” within the purview of
the FDCPA.

197

See 11 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 1692g.
See supra Section III.A. (discussing how the mini-Miranda warning conflicts
with the automatic stay and how the debt validation process confuses debtors in
challenging the validity of a claim).
199
See Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating
that “[a] debt collector could not satisfy the FDCPA by including the notice of rights
in a proof of claim, because ‘a communication in the form of a formal pleading’ is not
an ‘initial communication’ under the FDCPA”); In re McCarther-Morgan, No. 0790654, 2009 WL 7810817, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2009) (holding that the
“formal pleading” exception included proofs of claim); In re F.C.M. Corp., No. 870946-CIV-DAVIS, 1987 WL 364456, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1987) (stating that
filing a proof of claim is the equivalent of filing a complaint); Nortex Trading Corp. v.
Newfield, 311 F.2d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 1962) (same); In re Brosio, 505 B.R. 903, 912
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (same).
200
See In re Franchi, 451 B.R. 604, 607 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (“Courts
routinely recognize that the filing of a proof of claim is analogous to the filing of a
complaint.”); In re Cont’l Airlines, 928 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
filing a proof of claim is analogous to filing a complaint in a civil action).
198
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This alternative solution is significant because it allows for
compliance with both federal statutes without inferring repeal of
the FDCPA. It achieves this result and also avoids the direct
conflict between the FDCPA notice requirements and the
automatic stay completely.
By holding that the “formal
pleadings” exception applies to proofs of claim, the judicial
inclination against repeal by implication can be avoided
altogether.201
In conclusion, courts should hold that the formal pleadings
exemption, under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d), apply to
proofs of claim. As such, this will resolve certain contradictions
without implying that the FDCPA be implicitly repealed in the
bankruptcy context.
B.

Proofs of Claim Asserting a Stale Debt Should Not Constitute
a Per Se Violation of the FDCPA

In addition, courts should hold that filing a proof of claim,
even when asserting a debt, should not constitute a per se
violation of the FDCPA absent any additional factors. By using
this approach, courts may be able to maximize the effect of both
federal statutes while eliminating the issue of debtors resorting
to the FDCPA over the Bankruptcy Code.
Courts should hold that a proof of claim asserting a stale
debt, without additional factors, does not constitute an automatic
violation of the FDCPA. If the only impediment to the proof of
claim is the expiration of the statute of limitations, the FDCPA
should not be implicated and the debtor’s only remedy is through
the Bankruptcy Code.
Absent additional factors such as
misrepresentation of information or other deceptive conduct, the
FDCPA should not be implicated. The underlying rationale
being that, in rejecting the unfair analogy from state court,202
filing a proof of claim and giving full disclosure of the timing of
the debt does not constitute false or misleading behavior that the
FDCPA seeks to remedy.203
201
See supra Section III.C.2. (discussing repeal by implication as not favorable
as a concern against preclusion of the FDCPA).
202
Section 1692f of the FDCPA provides that “[a] debt collector may not use
unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”
15 U.S.C. § 1692f (2012) (emphasis added).
203
Section 1692e provides that “[a] debt collector may not use any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of
any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (emphasis added).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
adopted this same approach in In re Gatewood.204 Although the
Eighth Circuit held that an accurate proof of claim, disclosing all
relevant information, does not automatically violate the FDCPA,
it did not clearly articulate what situations would implicate
FDCPA liability.205 Accordingly, courts should expand upon the
Gatewood court’s reasoning and hold that situations involving
misrepresentation, deception, and omission of relevant facts may
constitute a violation of the FDCPA.
The importance of this approach allows both the federal
statutes to function as intended without significant interference
with one another. Further, this prevents a court from implying
that the FDCPA is partially or completely repealed in the
bankruptcy context. Debt collectors can still incur FDCPA
liability if they resort to deceptive tactics such as misinformation
or omission of relevant information. However, if they candidly
disclose the timing of their debt, given the supervision of the
court, and the presence of a trustee, this cannot be regarded as
unfair under the meaning of the FDCPA.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Note argues that the FDCPA should be
inapplicable in the context of filing proofs of claim. However,
recognizing that implied repeal of federal statutes is generally
disfavored, this Note offers some alternative solutions to
addressing this issue. First, courts should hold that proofs of
claim fall within the “formal pleading” exceptions to avoid
requirements under §§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d) of the FDCPA.
Second, courts should find that filing a proof of claim for a stale
debt, by itself, does not constitute “unfair or unconscionable” or
“false or deceptive” conduct as contemplated by the FDCPA.
Accordingly, this avoids the implied repeal of the FDCPA while
achieving the same, and arguably more efficient, result.

204
205

In re Gatewood, 533 B.R. 905 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 910.

